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Cholera epidemic in Yemen, 2016–18: an analysis of 
surveillance data
Anton Camacho, Malika Bouhenia, Reema Alyusfi, Abdulhakeem Alkohlani, Munna Abdulla Mohammed Naji, Xavier de Radiguès, 
Abdinasir M Abubakar, Abdulkareem Almoalmi, Caroline Seguin, Maria Jose Sagrado, Marc Poncin, Melissa McRae, Mohammed Musoke, 
Ankur Rakesh, Klaudia Porten, Christopher Haskew, Katherine E Atkins, Rosalind M Eggo, Andrew S Azman, Marije Broekhuijsen, 
Mehmet Akif Saatcioglu, Lorenzo Pezzoli, Marie-Laure Quilici, Abdul Rahman Al-Mesbahy, Nevio Zagaria, Francisco J Luquero
Summary
Background In war-torn Yemen, reports of confirmed cholera started in late September, 2016. The disease continues 
to plague Yemen today in what has become the largest documented cholera epidemic of modern times. We aimed 
to describe the key epidemiological features of this epidemic, including the drivers of cholera transmission during 
the outbreak.
Methods The Yemen Health Authorities set up a national cholera surveillance system to collect information on 
suspected cholera cases presenting at health facilities. Individual variables included symptom onset date, age, severity 
of dehydration, and rapid diagnostic test result. Suspected cholera cases were confirmed by culture, and a subset of 
samples had additional phenotypic and genotypic analysis. We first conducted descriptive analyses at national and 
governorate levels. We divided the epidemic into three time periods: the first wave (Sept 28, 2016, to April 23, 2017), 
the increasing phase of the second wave (April 24, 2017, to July 2, 2017), and the decreasing phase of the second wave 
(July 3, 2017, to March 12, 2018). We reconstructed the changes in cholera transmission over time by estimating the 
instantaneous reproduction number, Rt. Finally, we estimated the association between rainfall and the daily cholera 
incidence during the increasing phase of the second epidemic wave by fitting a spatiotemporal regression model.
Findings From Sept 28, 2016, to March 12, 2018, 1 103 683 suspected cholera cases (attack rate 3·69%) and 2385 deaths 
(case fatality risk 0·22%) were reported countrywide. The epidemic consisted of two distinct waves with a surge in 
transmission in May, 2017, corresponding to a median Rt of more than 2 in 13 of 23 governorates. Microbiological 
analyses suggested that the same Vibrio cholerae O1 Ogawa strain circulated in both waves. We found a positive, 
non-linear, association between weekly rainfall and suspected cholera incidence in the following 10 days; the relative 
risk of cholera after a weekly rainfall of 25 mm was 1·42 (95% CI 1·31–1·55) compared with a week without rain.
Interpretation Our analysis suggests that the small first cholera epidemic wave seeded cholera across Yemen during 
the dry season. When the rains returned in April, 2017, they triggered widespread cholera transmission that led to the 
large second wave. These results suggest that cholera could resurge during the ongoing 2018 rainy season if 
transmission remains active. Therefore, health authorities and partners should immediately enhance current control 
efforts to mitigate the risk of a new cholera epidemic wave in Yemen.
Funding Health Authorities of Yemen, WHO, and Médecins Sans Frontières.
Copyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license.
Introduction
Yemenis continue to endure the devastating 
consequences of the war that erupted in March, 2015. 
While this conflict has officially caused at least 
8757 deaths among civilians and injured more than 
50 000 people, its broader impact has severely disrupted 
society and infrastructure.1 3 million people have been 
displaced and the health system has lost capacity to 
provide even basic services, with 55% of health facilities 
being no longer fully functional.2 Moreover, with 
damaged water supply infrastructure, chronic water 
scarcity, and surging water prices, the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates 
that more than 50% of the 29·9 million Yemenis are in 
need of water and sanitation assistance.3,4 Against 
the backdrop of this crisis, the largest reported cholera 
epidemic to date is increasing the suffering of this 
vulnerable population.
Even healthy individuals can die of cholera within 
hours after symptoms begin.5 Vibrio cholerae produces a 
profuse watery diarrhoea that can quickly progress to 
dehydration and hypovolaemic shock, and can kill up to 
50% of patients if fluids are not properly replaced.6 
However, the case fatality risk (CFR) can be less than 
1% with appropriate case management.5 Scarcity of 
adequate treatment is more common during the initial 
phase of unexpected outbreaks and in crisis settings. 
Inadequate preparedness has determined much of the 
mortality burden associated with cholera during some of 
the largest contemporary epidemics.7–9
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The largest previous outbreaks of the current seventh 
cholera pandemic, including those from Haiti,7 
Zimbabwe,10 and Goma (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo),11 share two common characteristics: an initial 
explosion of cases and difficulty providing an adequate 
medical response. Together, these translated into a massive 
surge of cases and a relatively high fatality risk during the 
first weeks of the epidemics. By contrast, the outbreak in 
Yemen, which began in late September, 2016, featured a 
small first wave, a larger second wave (beginning in late 
April, 2017), and a low CFR, despite the highly precarious 
situation in the country. As such, the factors that drove the 
cholera epidemic in Yemen are unclear. This uncertainty 
hampers design of tailored public-health interventions and 
assessment of risk and location of future waves.
In this study, we quantified the size, spatial extent, and 
key populations affected by the two epidemic waves in 
Yemen and attempted to determine the plausible drivers 
of cholera transmission during the course of the outbreak.
Methods
Cholera surveillance system
The Yemen Health Authorities with support from WHO 
set up an electronic integrated disease early warning 
system in 2013, which gradually increased from 
98 reporting sites to 1982 by the end of 2016.12 Upon 
confirmation of the first cholera case, public and private 
health facilities that were part of this countrywide 
cholera surveillance system collated suspected cases 
using a common line-list database (Excel 2010, 
Microsoft). Following the recommendations of the 
surveillance working group of the Global Task Force on 
Cholera Control,13 a suspected case was any patient 
presenting with three or more liquid stools with or 
without vomiting in the past 24 h. A confirmed case was 
a suspected case with V cholerae O1 or O139 confirmed 
by culture. This database contains dates of disease onset 
and admission, age, sex, district of origin, dehydration 
severity (based on the WHO severity grading5), 
laboratory results when available, and disease outcome 
(discharge or death). District surveillance officers 
(for each of the 333 districts) compiled the line-list from 
all health facilities in their district. This district line-list 
database was sent electronically to the governorate level 
(23 total governorates) each day. Data were aggregated 
by the Emergency Operation Centre run by the Yemen 
Health Authorities and cleaned by WHO surveillance 
officers to remove duplicates, standardise district 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We did a PubMed search with dates between Jan 1, 1970, and 
March 14, 2018, for studies published in English using the search 
terms “cholera” [title] AND (outbreak OR rain OR (infection AND 
immunity)). We then manually selected relevant articles on the 
basis of the title and by reading the abstracts. Additionally, 
we obtained the history of cholera outbreaks in Yemen since 1971 
from the Global Health Observatory data repository. The 
seventh cholera pandemic has caused a large burden of disease 
worldwide for more than 50 years, with the highest burden of 
disease in Africa, the Americas, and southern Asia. Explosive 
cholera outbreaks have been observed in the past 10 years  years 
in several African countries and Haiti. Some of these outbreaks 
have been observed during rainy seasons and some studies have 
found positive associations between rainfall and cholera risk. 
Seventh pandemic strains have spread in the Middle East 
causing outbreaks in several countries, including Yemen, 
although without reaching the size of the outbreaks reported in 
Africa or Haiti. Yemen reported a limited number of cholera 
cases to WHO in ten out of 40 years from 1971 to 2010, with the 
largest number (1953 suspected cholera cases) reported in 1979. 
In 2011, a larger cholera outbreak was reported with 
31 789 cases and 45 deaths. After a lull of 5 years, a new cholera 
outbreak started in 2016 and continued to spread in 2017, 
becoming the largest documented cholera epidemic of modern 
times with more than 1 million suspected cholera cases reported 
so far. By contrast with previous nationwide cholera outbreaks 
such as in Haiti, the outbreak in Yemen featured a small first 
wave in 2016 followed by a larger second wave in 2017.
Added value of this study
Understanding what factors drove the cholera epidemic in 
Yemen is key to the design of tailored public-health 
interventions and assessment of the risk and location of future 
waves. To our knowledge, our study is the first to quantify the 
size, spatial extent, and key populations affected by the 
two epidemic waves in Yemen and determine the plausible 
drivers of cholera transmission during the course of the 
outbreak. We found that the small first cholera epidemic wave 
in 2016 had a key role in seeding the bacteria across Yemen 
during the dry season. When the rains returned in April, 2017, 
they triggered widespread cholera transmission that led to the 
large second wave observed during the following months. 
This conclusion is further supported by our microbiological 
analyses, which suggest that the resurgence of the epidemic 
in 2017 is unlikely to have resulted from the introduction of a 
new Vibrio cholerae strain.
Implications of all the available evidence
Our findings have important operational implications for Yemen 
and for other countries facing cholera epidemics. In Yemen, with 
the return of the 2018 rainy season, a potential third wave could 
occur, which would further weaken a very vulnerable population. 
This report thus calls for urgent action to enhance current 
control efforts, including the epidemiological and 
microbiological surveillance, vaccination, and water and 
sanitation interventions, all which need a large commitment 
from local officials, donors, and international partners to stop 
the spread of cholera.
See Online for appendix
For the Global Health 
Observatory data repository 
see http://apps.who.int/gho/
data/node.home
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names, and solve inconsistent entries (eg, inverted 
month and day in date format).
Laboratory analysis
Governorates provided periodic samples of stool 
specimens from suspected cases to confirm the presence 
of V cholerae using standard culture methods.14 In addition, 
ten V cholerae isolates from the 2016 epidemic wave and 
31 from 2017 were selected by convenience sampling and 
sent to the French National Reference Center for Vibrios 
and Cholera (Pasteur Institute, Paris, France) for 
additional phenotypic and genotypic analysis. Cholera 
rapid diagnostic tests (Crystal VC, Span Diagnostics, 
Surat, India) were supplied by the Yemen Health 
Authorities with the recommendation to perform a rapid 
diagnostic test on one in ten suspected cases in each 
cholera treatment centre.
Rainfall data
Because of the scarcity of functional ground weather 
stations in Yemen since the start of the war 
(appendix p 13), rainfall data were estimated indirectly 
from satellite imagery. High resolution (0·05°) gridded 
daily precipitation data were obtained for 2016–18 from 
the Climate Hazards Group Infrared Precipitation with 
Stations (CHIRPS) data.15 Daily precipitation time series 
for each district were computed by a weighted mean of 
the grid cells, with weights proportional to the fraction 
of each grid cell contained within the district. 
Data analysis
We calculated weekly time series of suspected cholera 
cases, CFR (ratio of the numbers of suspected deaths 
over suspected cases), proportion of cases classed as 
severe (patients with fluid deficit assessed to be greater 
than 10% of their bodyweight5), proportion of cases in 
children younger than 5 years, proportion of tested and 
positive rapid diagnostic tests, and proportion of tested 
and positive cultures. Exact binomial confidence intervals 
were calculated for all proportions.
To describe the spatiotemporal dynamics, we divided 
the epidemic into three time periods: the first wave 
(Sept 28, 2016, to April 23, 2017), the increasing phase of 
the second wave (April 24 to July 2, 2017), and the 
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Figure 1: Weekly time series of key cholera indicators for Yemen between 
Sept 28, 2016, and March 12, 2018
(A) New suspected cholera cases. (B) Case fatality risk (CFR; number of deaths 
divided by number of suspected cases). (C) Proportion of severely dehydrated 
patients. (D) Proportion of cases in children younger than 5 years of age. 
(E) Proportion of female cases. (F) Percentage of suspected cases with a rapid 
diagnostic test (RDT; pink bars) and percentage positive (blue line). 
(G) Proportion of cases tested for culture confirmation (per 1000, pink bars) and 
percentage positive (purple line). Shaded areas correspond to exact binomial 
95% CIs for proportions. The Ramadan period (May 26–June 24, 2017) is 
indicated by a grey rectangle. The first vertical dashed line defines the end of the 
first wave/start of the increasing phase of the second wave and the second 
vertical dashed line indicates the end of the increasing phase/start of the 
decreasing phase of the second wave of the epidemic.
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decreasing phase of the second wave (July 3, 2017, to 
March 12, 2018; figure 1A). For each period, we calculated 
the attack rate ratio of each district as the ratio of the 
district to country-level attack rates. An attack rate ratio 
above 1 indicates that a district had a higher attack rate 
compared with the national average during that epidemic 
phase.
We quantified the transmission rate of cholera through 
time by estimating the daily instantaneous reproduction 
number (Rt),16 defined as the average number of 
secondary cases caused by an infected individual at 
time t. We used the daily suspected case counts and the 
serial interval distribution to estimate the posterior 
distribution of Rt using the R package EpiEstim16 
(appendix pp 5–6). Consistent with previous estimates, 
we modelled the serial interval as a gamma distribution 
with a mean of 5 days and SD of 8 days.17
We estimated the association between rainfall and 
incidence of cholera during the increasing phase of 
the second wave (April 15–June 24, 2017). We fitted a 
quasi-Poisson generalised additive mixed model to the 
time series of suspected cases of the 285 districts that 
reported at least one cholera case during that period. For 
each day, we defined the accumulated rainfall over the 
previous 7 days as AR7D. We used a distributed-lag 
non-linear model with penalised splines18 to infer the 
cumulative effect of AR7D on cholera incidence over the 
following 10 days. We also tested whether the risk 
of becoming infected with cholera changed during 
Ramadan, when human movement and eating patterns 
tend to change, by including a fixed effect and a random 
effect for each district for the period May 26–June 24, 2017. 
The model also accounted for spatial clustering and 
changes in the immune population, as well as 
autocorrelation and overdispersion in the case counts 
(appendix pp 6–13).
We conducted two supplementary analyses in order 
to assess the risk of a third epidemic wave in 2018. 
First, we used results from rapid diagnostic tests and 
culture performed during the last 3 weeks of available 
Population Cases AR (%) Deaths CFR (%) Rapid diagnostic test Culture confirmation
Tested, n (%*) Positive, n (%†) Tested, n (%*) Positive, n (%†)
Abyan 611 303 29 057 4·75% 35 0·12% 312 (1·1%) 158 (50·6%) 115 (0·4%) 33 (28·7%)
Aden 956 667 22 635 2·37% 81 0·36% 688 (3·0%) 369 (53·6%) 230 (1·0%) 161 (70·0%)
Al Bayda 770 151 34 537 4·48% 47 0·14% 2182 (6·3%) 907 (41·6%) 200 (0·6%) 15 (7·5%)
Al Dhale’e 753 361 48 672 6·46% 85 0·17% 380 (0·8%) 130 (34·2%) 20 (0·0%) 7 (35·0%)
Al Hudaydah 3 345 560 163 533 4·89% 301 0·18% 4443 (2·7%) 1296 (29·2%) 411 (0·3%) 238 (57·9%)
Al Jawf 648 754 16 139 2·49% 22 0·14% 1515 (9·4%) 919 (60·7%) 36 (0·2%) 12 (33·3%)
Al Maharah 162 385 1168 0·72% 1 0·09% 263 (22·5%) 118 (44·9%) 21 (1·8%) 14 (66·7%)
Al Mahwit 760 725 64 247 8·45% 153 0·24% 2198 (3·4%) 1036 (47·1%) 71 (0·1%) 14 (19·7%)
Amanat Al Asimah 3 308 478 105 693 3·19% 73 0·07% 6251 (5·9%) 2377 (38·0%) 593 (0·6%) 204 (34·4%)
Amran 1 529 834 104 710 6·84% 178 0·17% 2499 (2·4%) 730 (29·2%) 116 (0·1%) 26 (22·4%)
Dhamar 2 121 016 104 888 4·95% 166 0·16% 3889 (3·7%) 491 (12·6%) 149 (0·1%) 34 (22·8%)
Hajjah 2 474 661 123 658 5·00% 443 0·36% 869 (0·7%) 230 (26·5%) 55 (0·0%) 23 (41·8%)
Ibb 3 065 230 71 281 2·33% 301 0·42% 905 (1·3%) 539 (59·6%) 107 (0·2%) 32 (29·9%)
Lahj 1 052 545 25 448 2·42% 23 0·09% 1228 (4·8%) 602 (49·0%) 82 (0·3%) 27 (32·9%)
Marib 359 586 7296 2·03% 7 0·10% 197 (2·7%) 128 (65·0%) 2 (0·0%) 0
Moklla 799 268 568 0·07% 2 0·35% 105 (18·5%) 80 (76·2%) 43 (7·6%) 32 (74·4%)
Raymah 633 758 19 188 3·03% 123 0·64% 639 (3·3%) 420 (65·7%) 41 (0·2%) 15 (36·6%)
Sa’ada 890 273 10 711 1·20% 5 0·05% 920 (8·6%) 752 (81·7%) 12 (0·1%) 0
Sana’a 1 250 811 79 132 6·33% 135 0·17% 3513 (4·4%) 873 (24·9%) 272 (0·3%) 66 (24·3%)
Say’on 668 880 23 0·00% 0 0·00% 22 (95·7%) 9 (40·9%) 8 (34·8%) 0
Shabwah 646 685 1484 0·23% 3 0·20% 128 (8·6%) 54 (42·2%) 20 (1·3%) 9 (45·0%)
Taizz 3 059 408 69 615 2·28% 201 0·29% 1648 (2·4%) 1006 (61·0%) 425 (0·6%) 325 (76·5%)
Yemen (first wave‡) 29 932 971 25 839 0·09% 120 0·46% 954 (3·7%) 251 (26·3%) 491 (1·9%) 181 (36·9%)
Yemen (second wave, 
increasing§)
29 932 971 277 167 0·93% 1663 0·60% 8154 (2·9%) 5873 (72·0%) 1286 (0·5%) 681 (53·0%)
Yemen (second wave, 
decreasing¶)
29 932 971 800 677 2·67% 602 0·08% 25 686 (3·2%) 7100 (27·6%) 1252 (0·2%) 425 (33·9%)
Yemen (total) 29 932 971 1 103 683 3·69% 2385 0·22% 34 794 (3·2%) 13 224 (38·0%) 3029 (0·3%) 1287 (42·5%)
AR=attack rate. CFR=case fatality risk. Socotra is the only Governorate that did not report any case, and was therefore not added to this table. *Proportion of suspected cases that were tested (cholera surveillance 
system recommendation is 10% for rapid diagnostic test). †Proportion of tested cases with positive result. ‡From Sept 28, 2016, to April 23, 2017. §From April 24 to July 2, 2017. ¶From July 3, 2017, to 
March 12, 2018. 
Table 1: Cholera indicators by governorate and nationally for the first and second waves
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data (from Feb 20, 2018 to March 12, 2018) in order to 
infer in which districts cholera transmission was likely 
to be still ongoing at that time (appendix pp 14–15). 
Second, we sought to make simple crude estimates 
of the proportion of the population that remained at 
risk in case of cholera re-introduction in 2018 (appendix 
pp 15–17). In brief, we tested six different scenarios 
by combining assumptions regarding the proportion 
of cholera infections reported up to March 12, 2018 
(20% or 50%) and the expected basic reproduction 
number (R0) at the outset of a potential third wave (1·2, 
1·6, or 2).
Role of the funding sources
The Yemen Health Authorities, with support from WHO, 
set up the data collection system. The funders of the 
First wave* Second wave First and second waves
Increasing phase† Decreasing phase‡
Suspected cholera cases, n (%)
<5 years 8509 (32·9%) 50 800 (18·3%) 256 423 (32·0%) 315 732 (28·6%)
≥5 years 17 075 (66·1%) 225 018 (81·2%) 534 361 (66·7%) 776 454 (70·4%)
Missing age 255 (1·0%) 1349 (0·5%) 9893 (1·2%) 11 497 (1·0%)
Total 25 839 (100%) 277 167 (100%) 800 677 (100%) 1 103 683 (100%)
Deaths, n (%)
<5 years 42 (35·0%) 252 (15·2%) 159 (26·4%) 453 (19·0%)
≥5 years 74 (61·7%) 1395 (83·9%) 438 (72·8%) 1907 (80·0%)
Missing age 4 (3·3%) 16 (1·0%) 5 (0·8%) 25 (1·0%)
Total 120 (100%) 1663 (100%) 602 (100%) 2385 (100%)
Case fatality risk (%)
<5 years 0·49% 0·50% 0·06% 0·14%
≥5 years 0·43% 0·62% 0·08% 0·25%
Missing age 1·57% 1·19% 0·05% 0·22%
Total 0·46% 0·60% 0·08% 0·22%
Severe cases (%) 
<5 years 1076/6129 (17·6%) 13 088/46 281 (28·3%) 22 806/250 418 (9·1%) 36 970/302 828 (12·2%)
≥5 years 2245/11 855 (18·9%) 64 131/206 400 (31·1%) 68 516/519 067 (13·2%) 134 892/737 322 (18·3%)
Missing age 42/145 (29%) 536/1018 (52·7%) 1049/9671 (10·8%) 1627/10 834 (15%)
Total 3 363/18 129 (18·6%) 77 755/253 699 (30·6%) 92 371/779 156 (11·9%) 173 489/1 050 984 (16·5%)
Female (%)
<5 years 3 790/8 507 (44·6%) 23 190/50 800 (45·6%) 116 130/256 423 (45·3%) 143 110/315 730 (45·3%)
≥5 years 8451/17 075 (49·5%) 123 897/225 017 (55·1%) 264 780/534 361 (49·6%) 397 128/776 453 (51·1%)
Missing age 139/255 (54·5%) 748/1349 (55·4%) 4743/9893 (47·9%) 5630/11 497 (49%)
Total 12 380/25 837 (47·9%) 147 835/277 166 (53·3%) 385 653/800 677 (48·2%) 545 868/1 103 680 (49·5%)
Positive rapid diagnostic test, n/N (%)
<5 years 44/208 (21·2%) 629/966 (65·1%) 1245/6021 (20·7%) 1918/7195 (26·7%)
≥5 years 206/743 (27·7%) 5222/7153 (73·0%) 5790/19 428 (29·8%) 11 218/27 324 (41·1%)
Missing age 1/3 (33·3%) 22/35 (62·9%) 65/237 (27·4%) 88/275 (32·0%)
Total 251/954 (26·3%) 5873/8154 (72·0%) 7100/25 686 (27·6%) 13 224/34 794 (38·0%)
Positive culture, n/N (%)
<5 years 31/143 (21·7%) 21/52 (40·4%) 47/147 (32·0%) 99/342 (28·9%)
≥5 years 146/336 (43·5%) 651/1213 (53·7%) 370/1043 (35·5%) 1167/2592 (45·0%)
Missing age 4/12 (33·3%) 9/21 (42·9%) 8/62 (12·9%) 21/95 (22·1%)
Total 181/491 (36·9%) 681/1286 (53·0%) 425/1252 (33·9%) 1287/3029 (42·5%)
Time to admission, n/N (%)
Same day 4352/17 998 (24·2%) 78 189/219 926 (35·6%) 249 499/787 878 (31·7%) 332 040/1 025 802 (32·4%)
1 day 8242/17 998 (45·8%) 124 949/219 926 (56·8%) 455 314/787 878 (57·8%) 588 505/1 025 802 (57·4%)
2 days 1491/17 998 (8·3%) 8176/219 926 (3·7%) 54 127/787 878 (6·9%) 63 794/1 025 802 (6·2%)
>2 days 3913/17 998 (21·7%) 8612/219 926 (3·9%) 28 938/787 878 (3·7%) 41 463/1 025 802 (4%)
*From Sept 28, 2016, to April 23, 2017. †From April 24 to July 2, 2017. ‡From July 3, 2017, to March 12, 2018. 
Table 2: Patients’ characteristics for the first and second waves
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study had no role in study design, data analysis, data 
interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding 
author had full access to all the data in the study and had 
final responsibility for the decision to submit for 
publication.
Results 
Between Sept 28, 2016, and March 12, 2018, 
1 103 683 suspected cholera cases and 2385 deaths were 
reported through the cholera surveillance system, 
representing an overall attack rate of 3·69% and a CFR of 
0·22% (table 1). The epidemic had two waves, the 
first peaking in mid-December, 2016 (1935 weekly 
suspected cases), followed by a second larger wave from 
late April, 2017, which peaked at the end of June, 2017 
(50 832 weekly suspected cases; figure 1A). During the 
4 weeks preceding the start of the second wave, 
998 suspected cholera cases were reported in 
11 governorates. Five of these 11 governorates confirmed 
the cases by culture (figure 1).
The CFR only exceeded 1% in the early stages of the 
first and second epidemic waves (figure 1B), except in 
cases older than 65 years (overall CFR >1%; appendix p 2). 
The proportion of severe cases followed a similar trend 
(figure 1C). Children younger than 5 years accounted for 
29% of the total suspected cases (table 2), but this 
proportion increased from 15% to 40% during the second 
epidemic wave (figure 1D). The overall sex ratio was 1·02, 
although there was a greater proportion of females 
among the suspected cases during the increasing phase 
of the second wave (figure 1E, table 2), in particular in 
those older than 15 years of age (58%, appendix p 3). 
984 339 (96%) of 1 025 802 suspected cholera cases visited 
health facilities within 2 days of symptom onset (table 2).
305 (92%) of 333 districts, mainly in the western part of 
Yemen, reported cases with highly heterogeneous attack 
rates (figure 2A, table 1). The spatial distribution of cases 
was distinct during each of the three time periods 
considered (figure 2B). Among the 180 districts affected 
during the first epidemic wave, southern districts were 
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of suspected cholera cases
(A) Attack rate by district between Sept 28, 2016, and March 12, 2018. (B) Attack rate ratio by district for the first wave (Sept 28, 2016, to April 23, 2017) and 
increasing phase (April 24 to July 2, 2017) and decreasing phase (July 3, 2017, to March 12, 2018) of the second wave of the epidemic.
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most at risk, although some northern districts also had 
an attack rate ratio above 1. The increasing phase of the 
second wave predominantly affected northern and 
central districts, located in the mountainous part of 
Yemen (appendix p 4), before expanding to coastal 
districts during the decreasing phase. The second wave 
showed more rapid geographical expansion: the number 
of districts reporting cases increased from six to 57 within 
4 weeks during the first wave; and from 19 to 213 during 
the second wave, 163 (77%) of which were also affected 
during the first epidemic wave (appendix p 5).
Between Sept 28, 2016, and March 12, 2018, 
1287 (43%) of the 3029 samples were confirmed as 
V cholerae O1 serotype Ogawa by culture (figure 1G, 
table 1). Additionally, 13 224 (38%) of 34 794 suspected 
cases tested positive by rapid diagnostic test. However, 
this percentage varied over time, rising to 81% at the 
peak of the second wave (figure 1F).
Molecular analyses showed that all 41 strains 
(ten isolated in 2016, 31 in 2017) were El Tor biotype 
(rstRElTor), shared the same V cholerae O1 variant strains 
ctxB genotype and tcpA sequence and the same antibiotic 
resistance phenotype, in particular resistance to 
nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim, and nalidixic acid, as well 
as a decreased sensitivity to fluoroquinolones. These 
common phenotypic and genotypic characteristics 
suggest that a single strain circulated during both waves 
in Yemen. Additional whole genome sequence analyses 
are being done at the Pasteur Institute (Paris, France) to 
conclusively confirm these results.
Figure 3: Daily time series of incidence, reproduction number, and rainfall by governorate between July 1, 2016, and March 12, 2018
(A) National incidence. (B) Contribution of each governorate to the national incidence. (C) Time-varying instantaneous reproduction number Rt represented by the 
mean estimate for the country (black line) and 95% credible interval for each governorate (shaded areas). (D) Country-level rainfall (mm per day). (E) Contribution of 
each governorate to the country rainfall. To obtain meaningful rainfall time series for comparison with cholera incidence time series at the national and governorate 
levels, we used a weighted mean of the district level rainfall time series, with daily weights proportional to the number of cases reported in each district over the 
following 2 weeks. To smooth the high level of noise in the daily reporting of suspected cases, we performed a rolling average with a 5-day time window on both the 
incidence (A) and reproduction number (C) time series. The Ramadan period (May 26–June 24, 2017) is indicated by a grey rectangle. 
July,
2016
October,
2016
January,
2017
April,
2017
July,
2017
October,
2017
January,
2018
Date of sympton onset
0
25
50
75
100
E
F
0
5
10
15
20
D
0
1
2
3
4
5
C
0
0·5
1·0
1·5
2·0
2·5
A
0
25
50
75
100
B
Da
ily
 in
cid
en
ce
 p
er
 1
0 
00
0
In
cid
ec
e
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
(%
)
Re
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
nu
m
be
r
Ra
in
fa
ll
 (m
m
 p
er
 d
ay
)
Ra
in
fa
ll
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
(%
)
Governorates
Al Maharah
Say'on
Socotra
Moklla
Shabwah
Al Jawf
Marib
Sa'ada
Abyan
Amran
Sana'a
Al Bayda
Hajjah
Amanat Al Asimah
Dhamar
Al Mahwit
Lahj
Al Dhale'e
Al Hudaydah
Ibb
Raymah
Taizz
Aden
Articles
e687 www.thelancet.com/lancetgh   Vol 6   June 2018
The first suspected cases were reported from 
four governorates in the final week of September, 2016, at 
the end of the rainy season (appendix p 5). Cholera then 
spread to 17 governorates with an overall Rt above the 
epidemic threshold of 1 (figure 3). The first wave 
decreased at the end of 2016, and despite some localised 
resurgence, Rt remained below 1 for the dry season, 
which ended in April, 2017.
As the rains returned, Rt rapidly increased nationally 
to 2 with 13 of 23 governorates having a median Rt of 
more than 2. These reproduction numbers translated into 
an increase in national daily incidence from 0·01 to 1 per 
10 000 between April 15 and May 15, 2017 (figure 3A). At 
the national level, Rt dropped during the second half of 
May, which coincided with the end of the spring rains, 
stabilising around 1–2. This period coincided with 
Ramadan (May 26–June 24, 2017), during which the daily 
incidence further increased to 2·4 cases per 10 000. The 
epidemic peaked 1 week after the end of Ramadan.
As the summer rainy season started, Rt again stabilised 
around 1 at the national level although in some 
governorates, such as Al Hudaydah, incidence increased 
again following the second peak of rainfall in August. 
Coinciding with the end of the summer rains, in 
October, 2017, Rt dropped below 1 and the daily incidence 
returned to less than 1 per 10 000.
The median cumulative rainfall over the previous 7 days 
rapidly increased to 20 mm at the end of April and remained 
between 10 mm and 30 mm, before dropping at the end of 
the third week of May, 2017 (figure 4C and 4D). We assessed 
rainfall as a driver of the expansion phase of the second 
wave (figure 4A).
The relative risk of being reported as a suspected cholera 
case in the 10 days following a week with 10 mm of 
cumulative rainfall was 1·21 (95% CI 1·15–1·28) compared 
with a week with no rain (figure 4B). Precisely, we 
estimated a non-linear rainfall-incidence risk response 
curve, with a peak at AR7D 25 mm, corresponding to a 
relative risk of 1·42 (95% CI 1·31–1·55) compared with no 
rain. The model showed a good fit to the data (R²=0·72, 
appendix p 11) and explained 80% of the deviance. In 
sensitivity analyses, models with different assumptions 
about the accumulated rainfall and lag periods showed 
qualitatively similar results (appendix pp 11–12).
We found substantial district-level heterogeneity in the 
effect of rainfall (figure 4E). The districts most at risk are 
on the mountainous north-south axis from Sa’ada to 
Taizz with coastal districts being at lower risk. Districts in 
the central governorates of Ibb and Taizz and in the 
northern governorate of Hajjah had the highest mean 
daily relative risk (>1·3) during the rainy period, from 
April 24 to June 1, 2017.
Finally, we found that the risk of being reported as a 
suspected cholera case during Ramadan was 1·19 (95% CI 
1·14–1·25) times higher than the risk during the 
preceding month and that this risk varied significantly 
across districts (appendix pp 12–13).
Results from 472 of 3119 positive rapid diagnostic tests 
and two positive cultures performed over the last 3 weeks 
of available data revealed that, as of March 12, 2018, 
cholera transmission was still active in 11 districts 
located in the Governorates of Ibb, Amanat Al Asimah, 
Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Bayda, Sana’a, and Al Mahwit. 
However, there were not enough rapid diagnostic tests or 
cultures performed in 131 districts in order to conclude 
whether transmission was still ongoing or had already 
stopped (appendix pp 14–15). 
Figure 4: Detailed analysis of the effect of rainfall on cholera incidence during the increasing phase of the 
second epidemic wave (April 15–June 24, 2017)
(A) Daily incidence and (C) accumulated rainfall during the 7 previous days (AR7D) in mm. Solid lines represent 
the day-wise median over all districts. Dark and light shaded areas represent the IQR and 95% quantile intervals 
(centred on the median), respectively. The Ramadan period (May 26–June 24, 2017) is indicated by a grey 
rectangle. (B) Relative risk (the ratio of cholera risk for individuals, cumulated over 10 days after a given AR7D 
exposure, to the risk when unexposed). Shaded area represents 95% CI. (D) AR7D distribution for all districts and 
days. The proportion for 0 mm is equal to 46% (omitted for the sake of visibility). (E) Mean daily relative risk 
attributable to rainfall during the rainy season (districts with no cases reported are in grey). For each district, the 
baseline risk corresponds to a typical day following a week with no rain. See appendix p 10 for a map of the 
highest daily relative risk.
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Under the most conservative scenario (i.e. the one that 
would lead towards lower estimates of the epidemic risk) 
assuming a reporting rate of 20% in 2016 and 2017 and a 
R0 of 1·2 in 2018, we found that 54% of the districts were 
at risk of an epidemic in case of cholera re-introduction 
in 2018, totalling a population at risk of more than 
13·8 million, which represents almost 50% of the 
population in the 305 districts previously affected by the 
first and second waves (appendix pp 15–17).
Discussion
Our results suggest that the spring rainy season triggered 
the large second wave of cholera in Yemen in late 
April, 2017. The second wave occurred synchronously 
across districts in Yemen, most of which had been affected 
during the first wave. The period of highest cholera 
transmission was limited to the 4 weeks of the spring rainy 
season, during which the daily national cholera incidence 
increased by 100 times and cholera spread across the entire 
country. By comparison, the summer rainy season in 
July–August had a smaller impact on transmission, mainly 
prolonging the second wave. This reduced effect possibly 
resulted from the scale-up of water, sanitation, and hygiene 
(WASH) interventions, which tripled between the spring 
and summer rainy seasons.19 These observations suggest 
that the transition between the dry and rainy seasons in 
April is key for WASH interventions in Yemen.
Previous work has mechanistically connected variation 
in rainfall to cholera transmission through decreased 
water levels during drought leading to increased use of 
unsafe water sources;20 contamination of water sources 
by flooding;20,21 and synergistic effects with zooplankton 
in waterways, increased iron in water leading to higher 
V cholerae survival, or variations in the bacteriophage 
population.22 Some of these mechanisms are plausible in 
the context of this epidemic. Yemen is affected by water 
scarcity, with most water drawn from deep groundwater.4 
The falling water table and fuel crisis resulting from 
conflict have made groundwater extraction more 
expensive,3 possibly resulting in increased use of surface 
water during the rainy season, especially at its start in 
April, when water resources are at their lowest after 
6 months of droughts. When wastewater and solid waste 
management systems are damaged, as they have been 
during the Yemen conflict, they can easily contaminate 
surface water.23,24 Further investigation of the mechanistic 
link between rainfall and cholera transmission in Yemen 
is needed, but this should not prevent the enhancement 
of current control efforts to reduce risk during the 
upcoming rainy season, for instance through point-of-use 
or household water filtration and disinfection.25
We found that the period of Ramadan that followed the 
spring rains was also associated with an increased risk of 
cholera transmission, suggesting that social behaviour 
could have influenced the epidemic spread in Yemen. 
During Ramadan, there is an increase in large gatherings 
for meals in which people share food,26 especially for Iftar 
(the daily breaking of fast at sunset), and people more 
frequently eat food from street vendors, which has been 
associated with an increased risk of cholera transmission 
in other settings.27 These findings suggest that a 
large-scale campaign for hygiene education and public 
health information should be implemented during the 
2018 Ramadan (May 15 to June 14), possibly involving 
Imams to deliver these messages.
Our study is based on a well maintained line-list 
database of more than 1 million records that allowed us 
to estimate the time-varying reproduction number for 
each governorate, and to quantify the increased cholera 
risk following the rains in April, 2017. However, our 
analysis of the drivers of transmission in the second 
wave are based on a single cholera season and our 
estimates should be interpreted with caution. If cholera 
transmission in Yemen continues, this association 
should be reassessed, ideally using rainfall data 
measured by ground weather stations (currently not 
available in Yemen) rather than estimated from satellite 
imagery, which often underestimates precipitation 
events (appendix p 13).15 Furthermore, our model did 
not account for long range population movements, 
which certainly had an important role in the spread of 
cholera, nor for changes in cholera surveillance over 
time, which could have affected the shape of the 
epidemic curve.
Although the case definition for suspected cholera is 
highly sensitive, it is not specific, and can lead to 
misclassification of diarrhoea due to other causes. 
Additionally, poor adherence to the case definition might 
have happened in inexperienced health facilities. More 
specific indicators such as the percentage of positive 
rapid diagnostic tests, the percentage of severe cases, and 
the proportion of patients younger than 5 years of age 
(who are more frequently affected by other enteric 
pathogens28) suggest that an increasing proportion of 
non-cholera diarrhoea cases could have been recorded in 
the cholera surveillance system during the decreasing 
phase of the second wave.
Over-reporting of cases has likely contributed to 
underestimates of the CFR in this epidemic. Additionally, 
poor access to health facilities, especially in areas near 
the frontline and directly affected by the war, could have 
led to underestimation of cholera burden, notably of 
mortality, as previously demonstrated in Haiti.29 However, 
Médecins Sans Frontières’ experience in Yemen suggests 
that the low estimates of the CFR could also reflect 
high rates of health-care seeking among the Yemeni 
population. Nearly all patients (96%) visiting health 
facilities with suspected cholera arrived within 2 days of 
symptom onset. Unlike in other countries where cholera 
occurs, the first places people in Yemen visited for care 
tended to be health facilities taking part in the cholera 
surveillance system, as opposed to private clinics or non-
allopathic healers. Until reliable cholera community 
death estimates become available for Yemen, CFR 
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estimates and the accompanying confidence intervals 
should be interpreted with caution.
If the relation between rainfall and cholera incidence 
is causal, the probability of observing another epidemic 
wave increases with both the magnitude of the 
2018 rainy season and the fraction of individuals 
remaining susceptible in each district. Although 
naturally acquired immunity following exposure to 
cholera is well established,30 the proportion of 
susceptible individuals depends on the duration and 
level of protection in symptomatic and asymptomatic 
infections, which is still unclear.31 However, on the basis 
of conservative assumptions, it is unlikely that the 
proportion of susceptible individuals is sufficiently low 
to reduce the reproduction number below the epidemic 
threshold and prevent future transmission in Yemen 
(appendix pp 15–17). Therefore, reducing the susceptible 
population might be an effective way to interrupt 
transmission or at least reduce the likelihood of 
widespread transmission when the rains return. 
Vaccination could achieve this reduction in the risk of 
cholera resurgence.32
To improve the chances of detection and containment in 
areas likely to be affected by ongoing transmission, the 
coverage of microbiological testing of suspected cases 
should be increased. As of March 2018, microbiological 
evidence suggests that there is both insufficient testing in 
131 districts but, importantly, continuing transmission in 
11 highly populated, mostly urban, districts (appendix 
pp 14–15). These urban districts would therefore benefit 
from immediate control efforts in order to mitigate the 
risk of cholera during the 2018 rainy season.
In conclusion, we found that the cholera epidemic in 
Yemen was shaped by the timing between cholera 
introduction, in September, 2016, and emergence of 
favourable environmental conditions for cholera 
transmission in April, 2017. The small first wave seeded 
cholera across the country during the dry season, 
leading to amplification in a major second wave during 
the rainy season. These findings have operational 
implications, including the need for improvements 
in epidemiological and laboratory surveillance, vacci-
nation, and water and sanitation interventions. If 
localised resurgence of cholera cases can rapidly be 
detected and contained during the 2018 rainy season, a 
potential third wave could be avoided. We thus make 
an urgent call for action on the part of local officials, 
donors, and international partners, to mitigate the risk 
of a new cholera epidemic wave in Yemen, which 
would certainly further weaken a highly vulnerable 
population.
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